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This comment discusses the pros and cons of the methodology and data used in our previous study on the cost-
effectiveness of armor on Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs), and responds to recent critiques by Franz Gayl. In
our previous article, we evaluated the large-scale Army policies to replace relatively light Type 1 Tactical
Wheeled Vehicles (TWVs) with moderately protected Type 2 variants, and later to replace Type 2s with heavily
protected Type 3s. We find that the switch from Type 2 to Type 3 TWVs did not appreciably reduce fatalities and
were not cost-effective. Mr. Gayl contends that the data and choice of control variables used in our original study
negatively bias our findings for Type 3 TWVs. We defend our previous conclusions and argue that Gayl’s sug-
gested approach of focusing on deaths per insurgent attack fails to account for effects of the vehicles on when,
where, and how attacks occurred. Our methodology does not suffer from this bias and measures effects on total
unit casualties rather those incurred per attack. We explain that our estimates are stable across many specifications
and are not sensitive to the choice of controls as Gayl suggests.
Keywords: Cost-effectiveness; Tactical Wheeled Vehicles; U.S. military; Value of a statistical life
JEL Classifications: H56, J17, D24
1. INTRODUCTION
In our previous article (Rohlfs and Sullivan, 2013), ‘The Cost-Effectiveness of Armored
Tactical Wheeled Vehicles (TMVs) for Overseas U.S. Army Operations,’ we evaluated two
large-scale policies to replace relatively light Type 1 TWVs with more heavily protected
Type 2 variants, and later to replace Type 2s with more heavily protected Type 3s. Our
conclusions state that ‘Type 2 TWVs reduced fatalities at $1.1 million to $24.6 million per
life saved for infantry units, with our preferred cost estimates falling below the $7.5 mil-
lion cost-effectiveness threshold, and did not reduce fatalities for administrative and sup-
port units. We find that replacing Type 2 with Type 3 TWVs did not appreciably reduce
fatalities and was not cost-effective.’
This comment responds to the forthcoming article by Franz Gayl (2013) titled, ‘Incom-
plete Rohlfs-Sullivan Analysis of the Cost-Effectiveness of Armored TMVs for Overseas
U.S. Army Operations,’ which is critical of our previous work in Rohlfs and Sullivan
(2013). The purpose of this comment is to justify the continued use of the methodology
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provided in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013) as an appropriate technique to evaluate the
cost-effectiveness of TWVs and reply to the critiques in Gayl (2013) including, but not
limited to, the following:
i. Contrary to the criticisms in Gayl (2013), we control for synchronized combat
activities, increasing troop levels, and other types of vehicles in our regressions.
Thus, our results are not biased due to these factors as suggested by Mr Gayl.
ii. Gayl (2013) maintains that his preferred method of sifting through detailed casualty
reports on an ‘attack-by-attack’ basis is a superior identification strategy to our mod-
eling technique for estimating the number of lives saved by heavily armored Type 3
TWVs. We discuss how this type of methodology ignores substitution effects in bat-
tle and incorrectly assumes that soldiers and insurgents behave in the same manner
regardless of the types of vehicles used in combat. We make the case that this type of
approach overestimates the lifesaving capabilities of Type 3 TWVs.
iii. Gayl (2013) asserts that the aggregate data we use in our original study biases our
results. We clarify the limitations of the data provided to us by the Department of
Defense (DoD) and show that these have little effect on our conclusions.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two contrasts the methodology used in Rohlfs
and Sullivan (2013) with what Gayl (2013) advocates. Section three discusses the data-sets
utilized in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013). Section four considers other critiques in Gayl
(2013) and section five concludes the comment.
2. METHODOLOGY
2.1. Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013)
As discussed in Section IV in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013), we use standard econometric
methods, including regression analysis, to estimate changes in unit-level casualty rates as a
function of each unit’s complement of vehicle types while controlling for other factors.
This modeling approach is shown below. From Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013):
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where q1it, q2it, and q3it represent the quantities of each of the three types of vehicles pos-
sessed by unit i in month t, x it is a vector of control variables that might include other
vehicle quantities, troop characteristics, or fixed effects for month, province, month by
province, or unit, e fit is random error, and the coefficients are allowed to vary by the unit’s
classification c as infantry, armored or cavalry, administrative and support, or other. Let
vehicle types one, two, and three be defined as Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3 TWVs.
Because the focus of this study is the effects of replacing one vehicle type with another, it
is convenient to rearrange the terms in Equation (1) to obtain the following specification:
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Equation (2) serves as our main regression specification, with
P3
j¼1 qjit, q2it, q3it, and







measure the effects of replacing Type 1 TWV with a Type 2 or Type 3 TWV.’
Like any armored wheeled vehicle, Type 3 TWVs have their positive (e.g. superior
armor protection) and negative (e.g. weight, bulkiness, and lack of maneuverability) attri-
butes. We use the aforementioned modeling approach to ‘measure the full reduced-form
effects of changing vehicle type, taking into account the intrinsic properties of the vehicles
and any behavioral responses by the units.’ Our emphasis on behavioral responses is a key
difference from others in the literature (citations withheld due to security concerns), which
show that the fraction of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks resulting in death is
higher for Type 1 and 2 vehicles than for Type 3 vehicles. We discuss the limitations of
these types of studies in detail below.
Gayl (2013) claims that we do not control for several factors that may have influenced
casualties in our analysis. These assertions are as follows:
i. Mr Gayl maintains that we do not control for ‘synchronized combat activities’ such
as, ‘new armored vehicle employment policies, the accelerated fielding of comple-
mentary advanced weapons equipment, a new COIN [counterinsurgency] strategy
and TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures], and related positive political
changes.’ Also, he states that we do not control for evolving ‘enemy tactics and
preferred weapons.’
• The monthly fixed effects allow us to control for any common shocks across units
each month. For instance, if an Army-wide policy existed that affected all units in
Theater A, then the monthly fixed effects would control for this. The monthly fixed
effects also control for any nationwide political changes, which would impact all
unit types. The province-by-month effects allow us to adjust for changes in the
combat environment across units. In addition, the unit-level controls allow us to
adjust for intrinsic differences between early and late receivers of the more protected
vehicles. In short, all of the synchronized combat activities and the evolving combat
environment that Mr Gayl claims we do not factor into our analysis are controlled
for in our regressions.
ii. Mr Gayl claims that we do not control for the major increase in troop levels in the
middle part of the conflict.
• We include monthly troop totals by unit as a control variable in our regressions. The
troop totals are one of the troop characteristics described in Equation (1). Thus, the
claim that we do not control for the increase in troop levels is incorrect.
iii. Mr Gayl asserts that we do not consider how a mixed fleet can have complemen-
tary benefits on the battlefield.
• Our modeling technique specifically includes various combinations of vehicle types.
Our model, therefore, estimates the lifesaving effects of all three vehicle types, not
just one in particular as Mr Gayl suggests.
We believe that our modeling technique provides the best estimates to date on the
lifesaving capabilities of the vehicles. Ours is the only study to our knowledge that
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incorporates behavioral responses to the vehicles in its estimates. Other studies have
focused on the casualty rate per IED attack by vehicle type which is similar to the identifi-
cation strategy that Gayl (2013) advocates. It is our belief that this type of methodology
overestimates the lifesaving capabilities of Type 3 TWVs by ignoring soldiers’ and insur-
gents’ behavioral responses to the vehicles.
2.2. Gayl (2013)
Gayl (2013) offers two identification strategies as alternatives for our modeling approach to
estimate the number of lives saved by Type 3 TWVs. His main identification strategy advises
researchers to sift through detailed casualty reports on an ‘attack-by-attack’ basis. Essentially,
he is recommending, as others have done in the past, a comparison of the IED casualty rates
from soldiers riding in Type 3 TWVs with Type 1 or 2 TWVs. In addition, he suggests exam-
ining other casualty types (for soldiers in vehicles) on an attack-by-attack basis that relate to
small arms fire, indirect fire attacks, sniper attack, etc., as well as indirect events, such as
drowning, roll-overs, crashes, and electrocutions. Gayl (2013) offers no estimates of his own
for any of these casualty numbers. The only citations he provides as justification for this iden-
tification strategy relate to IED attacks. The studies he cites find that, given an IED attack, it
is safer to be in a Type 3 TWV than a Type 1 or 2 TWV; we do not dispute this finding.
These types of studies assume, however, that soldiers in Type 3 vehicles are attacked by
IEDs at the same rate as soldiers in other vehicles. They also implicitly assume that the
extra protection on the Type 3 vehicles has no effect on the exposure of soldiers to attacks
not involving IEDs or occurring outside of vehicles. We believe that these assumptions are
not valid. For example, when soldiers adopted the heavily armored Type 3 vehicles, insur-
gents may have directed their efforts away from IED attacks on vehicles and toward
attacks on less armored soldiers outside of vehicles. Providing troops with safer vehicles
may have increased their willingness to take on risks. In the data, we saw strong evidence
of a ‘substitution effect’ among armored and cavalry units. When their Type 1 and 2 vehi-
cles were replaced with the heavier Type 3 vehicles, they made greater use of their TWVs
and less use of vehicles with more firepower, such as tanks. We have also heard anecdotes
of soldiers avoiding certain dirt roads and bridges when driving Type 3 TWVs due to their
weight. If one believes that the behavioral responses that we describe could have occurred
– and could have changed the rate at which units were exposed to different types of
attacks – then the appropriate way to measure the vehicles’ full effects is to use our
approach of examining the impact of the vehicles on units’ overall fatalities.
As a second identification strategy, Gayl (2013) argues that researchers should analyze
graphically how casualties changed during the main rollout of the Type 3 TWVs and high-
lights the time period between months 37 and 52 appearing in Panels A and E in Rohlfs
and Sullivan (2013). This time period witnessed an increase in the number of Army Type
3 TWVs and a decrease in overall Army casualty rates in Theater A. Of note, the large
reductions in Army casualties began to take place before substantial numbers of Army
Type 3 TWVs were present in Theater A. Gayl (2013) maintains that there were several
factors that caused the marked change in casualty rates between months 37 and 52, one of
which would have been the deployment of Type 3 TWVs. In addition, he states that other
policies, such as restricting Type 1 and 2 TWVs from going outside the wire, an increase
in the number of troops in theater, other equipment contributions, and other tactical
operations, caused the change in casualty rates.
Many factors, of course, influenced the decline in casualty rates during this time period.
Mr Gayl assumes that since theater-wide casualty reductions roughly coincided with
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increasing numbers of Type 3 TWVs, they must be related. We believe that, for the esti-
mates to plausibly identify a causal relationship, they must take into account the changing
combat environment and other policies that may have impacted casualties. We recommend
incorporating a vector of control variables that include, ‘other vehicle quantities, troop
characteristics, or fixed effects for month, province, month by province’ in the regressions
as a way to disentangle the effects of these other policies from Type 3 TWVs. Mr Gayl
offers no such solution to tease out these effects. Until such an estimation strategy is
provided, this type of time-series analysis does not justify the cost-effectiveness of Type 3
TWVs.
3. DATA
One critique of our study in Gayl (2013) is that the Army introduced Type 3 TWVs earlier
in the conflict than our aggregate data depict (as presented in Panel A, Figure I in Rohlfs
and Sullivan 2013). Mr Gayl suggests that this shortcoming may reverse our conclusions.
This section clarifies some of the limitations of the data that the Army Material Systems
Analysis Activity (AMSAA) provided us and how they may or may not influence our
conclusions.
3.1. AMSAA Sample Data Collection
The primary data-set that we use to obtain our estimates are the actual deployed field data
from the SDC. Due to concerns with the quality and granularity of Army-reported
Optempo and field-level logistics data,1 AMSAA’s SDC mission (as specified in United
States 2007, AR 750-1) seeks to acquire more accurate and detailed information at the
company level (which we aggregate to the battalion level) to be used for Army analysis.
As discussed in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013), ‘The SDC tracks a range of tactical and non-
tactical ground vehicle systems and includes each vehicle’s serial number, mileage, and
unit affiliation. The data measure a representative sample of roughly one-fifth of US Army
units in Theater A and roughly one-third of a typical sampled unit’s TWVs appear in the
data.’ Importantly, these data include information on the actual vehicles being used by
Army units on the ground. This is in contrast to many of the references in Gayl (2013)
which pertain to awarded contracts, requests from commanders, or other service types. To
our knowledge, the SDC are the most accurate data available at the company level for
Army units in Theatre A. The scrutiny from Mr Gayl does not pertain to the SDC data
since they contain little measurement error. His critiques apply to how we weight the SDC
data with the less-precise aggregate vehicle totals from the Army Material Command
(AMC). While the SDC includes data from a sample of vehicles in theater, the data-set
unfortunately does not include information on the rates at which different vehicles were
sampled. For this reason, we constructed sample weights by using the AMC data; we
discuss this process in detail below.
3.2. Army Material Command
In addition to the SDC data, the AMSAA provided us with aggregate vehicle totals that
were tracked and reported by the AMC’s Current Operations Update Briefing during the
1For instance, soldiers were not accurately writing down the numbers of vehicles they had or the mileage rates for
the vehicles they were using.
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course of Theater A’s conflict. The AMC is one of the primary organizations in the Army
that keeps records on the Status of Resources and Training Systems (SORTS) vehicle
quantities and their usage rates. After our original article was accepted for publication, it
came to our attention that certain organizations may have contributed limited numbers of
vehicles to Army units that were not included as part of the main AMC tracking system.
Had we been aware of this limitation of the AMC data prior to publication, we would
have noted it. Readers should be aware of this AMC data limitation when reading our
paper and Gayl (2013) is right to point out this shortcoming.
While Gayl (2013) is correct that a limited number of vehicles fell outside the AMC
tracking system, clarifications for the numbers he presents are in order. His main cri-
tique against the data states, ‘the Army had already long had hundreds of Type 3
TWVs, perhaps more than 350 by month 42.’ It is unclear how Gayl (2013) obtained
the specific figure of 350 from his text. To put this number into perspective, at the
peak of our data, there were 8500 Army Type 3 TWVs and a total of 24,300 Army
TWVs in Theater A. In contrast, the AMC data state that Army units had zero Type 3
TWVs in Theater A in month 42, with the numbers rapidly increasing shortly thereaf-
ter. Discussions with the DoD personnel lead us to believe that small numbers of
Army Type 3 TWVs were in theater before month 42; however, exact numbers appear
to be unavailable.
Figure I of Gayl (2013) displays some of his other critiques of the AMC data in graphical
form. In that Figure, Gayl (2013) states that up to 53 Type 3 TWVs were present in Theater
A by month eight and up to 500 by month 44. He cites his own work for the number 53
and the 500 value is from the website Olive-Drab.com.2 Notably, the 53 and 500 amounts
are for multiple service types, not just the Army. By comparison, the AMC numbers state
that Army units had zero Type 3 TWVs in month eight and 423 Type 3 TWVs in month
45.3 While some Army units may have received limited numbers of vehicles outside of the
AMC tracking system, it does not appear that they were in large supply.
Unfortunately, we are unaware of any data-set that contains the exact Army vehicle
quantities by month that were present in Theater A. To our knowledge, the AMC vehicle
totals are the best aggregate data available, given the Army’s tracking system. Our contacts
at the AMSAA have told us that they believe the number of vehicles outside the AMC
tracking system is limited and AMC’s Army-reported totals closely mirror those systems
deployed in theater (AMSAA 2010). Given the aforementioned limitations, however, the
aggregate numbers displayed in Panel A, Figure I in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013), may be
slightly different than their actual totals.
3.3. Weighting the SDC data
As stated previously, the primary data that we use in our regressions are from the SDC.
An important element, however, in obtaining accurate estimates relates to how we weight
2We are not permitted to disclose the actual titles of these references since they include the vehicle names in their
titles. Readers will have to refer to Mr. Gayl’s case study as referenced in Gayl (2013) for specifics on that
citation.
3The numbers for month 44 were not directly available since this was one of the months that we linearly
interpolated.
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the SDC data, as discussed in footnote four in our original article and its appendix.4 We
believe that, given the available data, this re-weighting of the data provides the best possi-
ble estimates of the numbers of vehicles associated with different units in the SDC. While
the AMC totals do enter into our computations, we believe that they represent the best
available estimates of the total numbers of Army vehicles in theater over our study period.
Moreover, if the theater-wide AMC totals under-count or over-count all vehicles by a fixed
amount, then the month x year fixed effects in our regressions will correct for any bias
generated by this under- or over-counting.
It is unclear how Mr Gayl would advise re-weighting the SDC data from his text. Our
preferred method, unsupported by Gayl (2013), is to use the AMC data to weight the SDC
vehicle totals. All of the weighting measures that we have tried point to the same conclu-
sion – Type 3 TWVs are not cost-effective. Until more appropriate weighting methods
emerge, we believe the data-sets and methods seen in Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013) provide
the best estimates for the vehicle types used in Army units.
Most, if not all, empirical studies encounter data limitations, and this study is not
immune to such issues. We agree with Mr Gayl that the AMC data does have some
limitations; however, the weighting criteria we use would have to be wildly inaccurate to
contradict our conclusions. Given our conversations with individuals at the AMSAA, we
believe that our weights are reasonably accurate reflections of the actual sampling weights
used and that it is highly unlikely that our weights are sufficiently imprecise as to change
our main findings. Gayl (2013) criticizes us for using the best data available without offer-
ing use of an alternative, viable weighting criterion or data-set. The difference between our
estimates and others is not due to minor disputes over data; this discrepancy exists because
our study takes into account the behavioral aspects associated with use of the vehicles,
while others focus primarily on their armor capabilities.
4. OTHER CRITIQUES IN GAYL (2013)
4.1. Not Citing the Literature on Armor Capabilities
Gayl (2013) is critical of our study for not citing other research showing that the armor
protection of a Type 3 TWV is better equipped to withstand IED attacks in comparison to
Type 1 or 2 TWVs. As stated previously, we readily agree with these findings and it
would have been beneficial to discuss this research in our original article. The Office of
Security Review (OSR), however, does not allow us to cite these types of studies. Thus,
4As we explain in the data appendix to our paper, the SDC data-set includes some fraction 1/wv of each type of
vehicle v that AMSAA tracks. Hence, each vehicle observed in the data represents wv vehicles that appeared in
the field. Unfortunately, these sampling weights do not appear in the data; in order to determine the approximate
numbers of vehicles owned by each unit, we had to estimate these weights. Data from the Defense Manpower
Data Center (DMDC) told us the total numbers of troops in each unit. To determine the fraction of troops who
belonged to units appearing in the SDC, we added these troop totals across all of the units in the sample and
divided them by the total number of troops in the theater. To estimate the sampling weights, we assumed that the
units were randomly sampled from the theater, so that for each vehicle type the number of vehicles per troop was
the same for units that appeared in the data as for units that did not. We then computed our sampling weights
using the AMC data on the total numbers of vehicles of each type in the theater. Suppose that the AMC data
showed that 10,000 vehicles of type v were in the theater in a given month. Suppose too that the troop data
showed that 20% of troops from the theater appeared in SDC units. By our assumption that the vehicles per troop
is the same for sampled and unsampled units, we conclude that this 20% of troops should have 2,000 type v vehi-
cles. If we only observe 1,000 type v vehicles in the entire sample, then we assume that wv is 2 – i.e. for each
vehicle observed in the sample for a given unit, there is another vehicle possessed by that unit that did not make
it into the sample. We construct these weights separately for each month of data included in the sample. The
AMC vehicle totals are available for an irregular set of months, and we linearly interpolate these totals for in
between months.
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Gayl (2013) is criticizing us for not discussing information that OSR restricts due to
security concerns.5
4.2. Causes for Type 3 TWV Delays
There are many reasons why the Army experienced delays in getting Type 3 TWVs into
Theater A. Gayl (2013) criticizes our work for not going into more detail on this topic.
Given that the purpose of our study was not to more thoroughly understand the reasons
for the Type 3 TWV delays, this criticism is strange. The motive of our study was to
determine the vehicles’ cost-effectiveness in relation to the number of lives that they save.
4.3. Not Using Mission Accomplishment as Our Outcome Variable
The primary outcome variable in our original study was unit fatalities. We find that Type 3
TWVs are not cost-effective for their lifesaving capabilities. In other words, the money
spent on Type 3 TWVs would be able to save more lives if spent on more cost-effective
programs that are currently being cut. Gayl (2013) finds fault with the use of fatalities as
our outcome variable in contrast to ‘mission accomplishment.’ He argues that, by focusing
on fatalities, we ignore other tactical advantages provided by Type 3 TWVs.
He is correct that Type 3 TWVs may provide other tactical advantages (such as being
able to more easily drive on IED ridden roads) and disadvantages (including greater noise,
lost maneuverability, and difficulty interacting with locals) in a combat environment. A
complete cost-benefit analysis would require the monetization of these non-traditional ben-
efits and costs (as outlined in Office of Management and Budget [OMB] 1992). This is an
inherently difficult task and would require collecting a massive amount of subjective data
with many additional assumptions. We did not view this as practical. Until new estimates
are provided to contradict our results, we believe that focusing on the principle aim (e.g.
saving lives) of the vehicle procurement program is justified.
4.4. Using Data From One Service Type
Gayl (2013) argues that our study focuses too narrowly on one service type. We agree
with Mr Gayl that it would be beneficial to analyze the cost-effectiveness of the various
TWVs for other service types. It is possible that an extension of our study might find that
Type 3 TWVs are cost-effective for other service types or in different combat environ-
ments. This point is important and readers should understand that our estimates only per-
tain to Army units in Theater A during the time period we study.
4.5. Favoring Data in an Urban Environment or from Particularly Active Units
Gayl (2013) criticizes the data we use for oversampling particularly active units and those
in urban settings. In our study, we included separate estimates for urban and rural environ-
ments and for high- and low-intensity units. In none of these cases did we find the Type 3
vehicles to be effective at reducing units’ fatalities. Therefore, the fact that some unit types
5Also, we are not permitted to disclose the actual names of the vehicles, the theater of operations, and specific
dates from our original work due to our contractual obligations with the DoD. We would prefer to be able to dis-
close all of these, but unfortunately we are restricted from doing so by OSR regulations. The reason that Mr Gayl
is allowed to discuss these topics is because he is not bound by the same agreement that we have with the DoD.
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were oversampled in comparison to others does not affect our final conclusions for Type 3
TWVs.
4.6. Analyzing the Effects of the Vehicles for Different Types of Units
Gayl (2013) is critical of the way we present our estimates separately for four different
unit types. All of the estimates appearing in Tables I and II of Rohlfs and Sullivan (2013)
show that Type 3 TWVs are ineffective in saving lives. Pooling all of the unit types
together into a single sample brings about the same conclusion; Type 3 TWVs are not
cost-effective.
5. CONCLUSION
For years researchers have compared the casualty rate per IED attack by vehicle type as a
means to estimate their lifesaving capabilities. This methodology is similar to the one
advocated in Gayl (2013). Focusing solely on troop casualties in vehicles pays no attention
to the possibility that insurgents may shift their attacks away from heavily armored vehi-
cles toward less-armored troops outside of vehicles. It also implicitly assumes that soldiers
behave in the same manner regardless of the vehicle type used. This type of approach
overestimates the lifesaving capabilities of heavily armored Type 3 TWVs. To our knowl-
edge, our study is the first to effectively incorporate the behavioral aspects of the vehicles
in its estimates and finds that Type 3 TWVs did not appreciably reduce fatalities.
As discussed in this article, Mr Gayl’s critiques about the AMC data have little impact
on our final conclusions. Furthermore, the assertion that controlling for synchronized com-
bat activities, increasing troop levels, and other types of vehicles might change our esti-
mates is incorrect, since we already control for these in our regressions. We believe that
our modeling technique provides the best estimates to date on the lifesaving capabilities of
Army TWVs and stand by our conclusions that Type 3 TWVs do not meet any of the
requirements necessary to be considered cost-effective for the number of lives they save.
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